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CALVINISMO 
Donald Heiney 
The fascination of the modern intellectual consciousness with the irrational is not 
hard to understand. It is a consciousness?this consciousness of ours?haunted by a 
suspicion that, in spite of the keenness of science and the indefatigability of schol 
arship, there is a mystery somehow hidden and concealed in the objects around us 
that has yet to be explained. And since the modern intelligence is a verbal one it 
seeks a verbal and graphic expression for this mystery which is by its nature in 
expressible. This has led it on the one hand to an interest in myth, from Fraser 
and Max Weber to Northrop Frye, and on the other hand toward a new meta 
physical literature, the most obvious exponents of which are Hesse and Borges. 
What I propose to do is to fit the fiction of ?talo Calvino into this pattern, and I 
shall argue that it fits in both categories?that is, that it involves simultaneously a 
return to, or reexpression of, the classic myths of the western consciousness, and 
the generation of new metaphysical hypotheses about the invisible world around 
us. A good deal of the confusion about the word myth?which probably should be 
banned from the critical vocabulary for a while, it has gotten so tattered?is due to 
a failure to distinguish between these two possible senses of the term. Such works 
as Doktor Faustus, Ulysses, Cocteaus La machine infernale, or Updike's The 
Centaur are conscious 
recastings of story patterns residual in the common memory 
and available, presumably, to both author and reader. The effect of such a narra 
tive turns 
necessarily around this common awareness in the author and the reader. 
For 
archetype critics the recastings can be unconscious, but at the level of formal 
istic study the distinction is not a fundamental one. On the other hand writers like 
Borges?the story "Tl?n, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius" is a good example?project outward 
from a quite personal imagination to create frameworks that explain, 
or seem to 
explain, the world of the invisible. Demian and Steppenwolf represent similar at 
tempts to create a body of synthetic myth. Demian is not a pure example, how 
ever, since Hesse borrowed Abraxis?little more than a name, and the notion of a 
metaphysical duality?from a preexisting system. 
Unlike Borges and Hesse, whose work involves a metaphysical quality from 
the beginning, Calvino arrived at his mythical-fantastic fiction only through a 
long period of development in which he worked gradually away from the realis 
tic. The book that gained him his first reputation, the Resistance novel II sentiero 
dei nidi di ragno (1947), came out of his first-hand contact with the events of the 
war in northern Italy, and with his impressions of the seacoast town of San Remo 
where he had spent his boyhood. The narrative is mimetic in at least this sense, 
that it is written out of direct personal experience and supported with observed 
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detail. It is also "realistic" in its extraordinary?virtually unique in the fiction of 
the Resistance?refusal to glamorize the partisans or show their behavior as more 
selfless or heroic than it really was. But beyond this point it is thoroughly and 
frankly literary. A more precise term is "parodistic," in the sense, devoid of any 
humorous element, in which parody is simply a literary form aware of form itself, 
consciously modeling itself on anterior literary forms, and presuming an awareness 
of these forms in the reader. Calvino has called the novel "Stevensonian," or at 
least has accepted this label for it. Pin, the boy-protagonist, is able to participate 
psychologically in the events of the war only within the framework of his own 
immature mentality. It is not that he fails to see the events about him as they 
are; on the contrary he has an extraordinary clairvoyance about them. But he 
persists in imposing on them a pattern of fabulosity like the structures found by 
other children in books; he can grasp what is happening to him only as a story. In 
plot and tone the novel resembles Treasure Island, and Pin is Jim Hawkins. But 
at another level?in the differing kind of awareness of the two authors, and their 
readers?there is a difference. Pin has not read Treasure Island, but Calvino has, 
and he expects his reader to be aware of the earlier novel, or at least of the 
genre of boy-adventure fiction. In this way the author and reader share a com 
plicity of awareness denied to the character. It is possible therefore to regard the 
novel as a 
romanticizing of the Resistance; not a sentimentalizing, but the con 
scious imposition on a body of historical material of a traditional literary apparatus. 
Although Calvino abandons this vein after his first novel, its fundamental premise 
?the application of synthetic frameworks to factual materials?underlies all his 
subsequent fiction. 
In his next period?and his work falls quite neatly into periods?he produced a 
set of short novels that might be described as perverse fairy-tales for the mature. 
In 11 visconte dimezzato (1952) the hero is blown in two by a cannon-ball and 
only half of him comes home to his Genoese estate. In the interim before he is re 
united with his left half, which crawls home more or less on its own account, he, 
or his right half, endeavors to function as normally as possible considering his 
circumstance. In II barone 
rampante (1957) the baron takes to the trees and 
stays there the rest of his life; in II cavali?re inesistente (1959) the knight does not 
exist and there is 
nothing but air inside his armor. What comment can a serious 
critic make on this playful nonsense? To take the first of the three first, it is obvi 
ous that the theme of human duality and the archetype of the Double are familiar 
in literature (the two halves of the viscount come to be called the Good 'Un and 
the Bad 'Un, until eventually they are sewed together by a British doctor). But 
the tone of the narrative is far from?even diametrically opposed to?that of con 
sciously allegorical fiction. Instead the tone is that of the "supposes" that are so 
delightful to children?"Suppose a knight were blown in two and his right side 
went one way and his left side went the other?what then?" The grave rationality 
of the development, its multiplication of detail, is exactly that of such childish 
fabulations, and Calvino, as a matter of fact, is also the editor of a volume of 
children's fables. Likewise, when we come to the other two novels, it would be 
banal and unnecessary to comment that modern man often feels like climbing a 
tree and not coming down, or that at other times he suffers from an identity crisis 
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which is at the bottom simply a fear that he may not exist. In fact the texture of 
the three tales is such that they succeed in making us forget these obvious cor 
respondances; this is their curious and particular merit. They 
are so rich in plausi 
ble and circumstantial detail that we are distracted by the details and lose our 
selves in observation of them, just as we do in Ufe itself. The two halves of the 
viscount are not rejoined by magic; there is no magic in Calvino. Instead they 
are united by procedures that, given the initial and improbable premise that a 
man could survive at all after being cut in two, are perfectly consistent with the 
principles of modern physiology. In their climactic duel the Bad 'Un manages to 
strike the Good 'Un in such a way that the old wound of his dividing is reopened. 
The Good 'Un swayed, but as he fell in a last wide, almost pitiful 
movement he too swung his sword very near his rival, from head to 
abdomen, between the point where the Bad 'Un's body was not and 
the point where it might have been. Now the Bad 'Uns body also 
spouted blood along the whole length of the huge old wound; the 
lungs of both had burst all their vein ends and reopened the wound 
which had divided them in two. Now they lay face to face and the 
blood which had once been one man's alone again mingled in the field. 
It is the clever British doctor Trelawney who sees the possibilities here and 
quickly stitches the two halves together, taking "great care to get all the guts 
and arteries of both parts to correspond." If the Fact is improbable the facts are 
so circumstantial that they end by convincing us. In a like manner 11 barone ram 
pante wins us to believe that it is possible, arboreologically, psychologically, and 
acrobatically, to spend one's life in trees, and II cavali?re inesistente almost con 
vinces us that it is possible to function even though one does not exist. The don 
n?e is implausible, but the authorial voice does not ask us to accept it. He only 
lowers it into the narrative, remarking, "Wait a minute and I will show you what 
happens." He then begins connecting up veins and arteries, 
nuts and bolts, with 
such a dextrous command of technology and such an offhand and plausible tire 
lessness that in the end he compels our belief even in the donn?e itself; other 
wise we would be obliged to reject all this copiousness of detail that has pleased 
us so much. The viscount must exist, since the doctor has stitched him together 
so cleverly. 
These three tales share an element that at first, perhaps, does not strike the 
attention. They are examples of what I will call "generative myth," even though 
they involve some borrowed elements, e.g. the archetype of the Double. I mean 
by this that they are fresh and original efforts to concretize the world of the in 
visible, yet sharing certain qualities with the body of received myths; that is, 
they are verbal, graphic, and somewhat mysterious. To this I will oppose "imita 
tive myth," the conscious recasting of some body of received materials in a more 
or less modern framework, for example the psychoanalytic in the case of Mourn 
ing Becomes Electra. In more complex systems like those of Blake, or of The 
Waste Land, the two elements are mingled; still I think it is important to identify 
them, when they are both present, and distinguish between them. Among the dif 
82 
ferences between them is the fact that generative myth is personal and individual, 
whereas imitative myth is, at least by the time it comes to our attention, a folk 
expression. I frankly don't know whether the Medusa is some unknown poet's in 
vention or the spontaneous and gradual creation of a people, although the sec 
ond is more likely. But at least for us it is a pattern in the common consciousness, 
and a modern writer who alludes to it or recasts it is 
appealing to 
a mutual aware 
ness in the reader. So one means of distinguishing between the two is the matter 
of personality and impersonality, and another is the question of whether the au 
thor assumes any foreknowledge of his story framework, or his form, on the part 
of the reader. It is the form that is parodistic or allusive in Calvino's fairy-tale 
novels. We are familiar with the fact that there can be fairy-tales, and we recog 
nize these as such. The myth contained in the form is totally fresh; we do not 
know what is going to happen to the viscount or the baron or the knight. We 
have heard of faces that turn people to stone, but not of noblemen split apart or 
air that walks around in a suit of armor. Instead of the pleasure of recognition, 
therefore, we have the sense of being present at the birth of a new image, one 
that almost, but not quite, explains something about the forces that govern our 
own destiny. 
These tales overlap slightly with four more or less realistic narratives of Cal 
vino's middle period: La speculazione edilizia (1957), La nuvola di smog (1958), 
La formica argentina (1958), and La giornata d'uno scrutatore (1963). I will pass 
over these rather slightly, since I am dealing mainly with the mythical or fabu 
lous tendency in his fiction, except to comment that even in these tales the real is 
mixed up with the grotesque in ways that stick unexpected pins in our sense of the 
possible. A leftist election-worker goes to work at a poll set up in an asylum 
where the voters are paralytics, dwarfs, and mental defectives. People harrassed 
by ants turn monomaniacal and invent grotesque machines to drop them into 
gasoline; they become antlike themselves. A writer for an anti-pollution agency 
realizes, after a time, that his job is to generate a verbal smog under which the 
industrial establishment can continue to operate. The chief achievement of the 
modern mind, the tales suggest, is that it boggles itself. Calvino's work of this 
phase has attracted relatively little attention, probably because the superficial rea 
lism of the tales conceals or at least muffles the bizarre for the ordinary reader, so 
that what happens in them may seem a little odd to him but not inconsistent with 
his existence as he knows it. If his life is grotesque he has failed to notice it, and 
the tales delineate the grotesquery so flatly that he accepts it without surprise as 
he does the real grotesquery of his life. 
The "fantascience" stories (to borrow the Italian term) of Calvino's more recent 
period, collected in Le cosmicomiche (1965) and Ti con zero (1967), represent 
a 
major break with his earlier fiction and are almost totally original in technique 
or literary mode, in spite of the fact that they are built on approximately the same 
premises as conventional science fiction. Each story, that is, begins with a scien 
tific statement, either imaginative or authentic, which is then projected until it 
generates a narrative apparatus. The genre rests on the assumption that the story 
in all its details is a necessary or at least plausible extension once the premise is 
accepted. All of Calvino's premises are authentic or "scientific," and most of them 
83 Criticism 
are drawn from modern astronomy. To take two as examples, there is the theory 
of Sir George H. Darwin that the Moon was once much closer to Earth than it is 
at present, or the calculations of Edwin P. Hubble which suggest that all the mat 
ter of the universe was once concentrated at a 
single point. Out of this the narra 
tive is generated: if this were so, what then would have happened and what would 
it have been like? The consequences of the donn?e are pursued with the same 
persevering and inexorable factuality of the mock fairy-tales. The stories of Le 
cosmicomiche and most of those of Ti con zero are recounted by a narrator named 
Qfwfq, whose consciousness goes back to the beginning of time and who thus 
recapitulates in his personal experience the whole history of the universe. But 
the effect of his tone, as a narrator, is not to astound or stupefy us with these in 
finities, but to present everything as perfectly natural and not very different, given 
the circumstances, from our own experiences. When all the matter in the universe 
was collected at one point "we were all there," he verifies matter-of-factly, "packed 
in like sardines," including the seductive Mrs. Ph(i)Nko and the rather obnoxious 
Mr. Pbert Pbert, even though he concedes that the image is a purely literary one, 
since in a single point there wasn't even space for them to be packed into. The 
social and psychological consequences that follow have their due analogy to cer 
tain problems encountered in modern urban societies, but this is not really the 
point. If Qfwfq falls into anachronism it is because concept is in the end verbal, 
because in transmitting his experience he is obliged to express it in our own lan 
guage and communicate to us in the framework of our own psychology. Or, to 
take it from the authorial point of view, because Calvino doesn't have the slight 
est idea what it would be like to live in a universe contracted to one point and 
prefers to extrapolate from his own and our experience of urban overcrowding; 
because the texture of his narrative, in other words, is vernacular and contempor 
ary no matter how fantastic his premises. For "vernacular and contemporary" we 
may read realistic, but it is a realism of a very special sort, a realism that almost 
totally transcends the mimetic. The contemporaneity includes not only the objects 
of our existence but the furniture of our minds, a complicated matter in the case 
of the educated mind. 
Art, of course, can imitate other things than concrete reality. Imitative myth, 
insofar as it is latent in our consciousness, emerges as part of the fabric of a nar 
rative which is in one sense fabulous and in another quite diurnal and prosaic. 
Qfwfq remembers when the Moon was so near that, going out in a boat near the 
Zinc Cliffs, you could elevate a ladder and climb up to it. In this way it was pos 
sible to fill buckets with Moon-milk . . . 
. . . 
very thick, like a kind of cream cheese . 
. . formed in the crev 
ices between one scale and the next, through the fermentation of the 
various bodies and substances of terrestrial origin which had flown 
up from the prairies and forests and lakes, as the Moon sailed over 
them . . . 
vegetal juices, tadpoles, bitumen, lentils, honey, starch crys 
tals, sturgeon eggs, molds, pollens, gelatinous matter, worms, resins, 
pepper, mineral salts, combustion residue. 
Distracted by these catalogs, and by things like the complicated techniques prac 
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ticed by the narrator's deaf cousin for passing from one planet to the other 
through utilizing their differential magnetic attractions, we hardly notice that the 
three-cornered romance involving Mrs. Vhd Vhd, Qfwfq, and the Deaf One has 
coalesced gradually into a retelling of the Endymion myth. 
I still look for her as soon as the first sliver appears in the sky, and 
the more it waxes, the more clearly I imagine I can see her, her or 
something of her, but only her, in a hundred, a thousand different vis 
tas, she who makes the Moon the Moon and, whenever she is full, sets 
the dogs to howling all night long, and me with them. 
But the classic myth has been contemporized at the same time that the scientific 
premise has been spread out and absorbed, like butter under a butter-knife, into 
myth; the myth and all the details and catalogs blur into a single point of time 
which, if we are to take the tone of the narrative as an index?the only index we 
have?is our own. The three elements, in short, are the scientific premise, the 
myth, and the prosaic of daily existence; and in the end the last term subsumes 
the others. The end result, or total effect of the story, is something which did not 
exist before, myth at the generative level. 
It goes without saying that a narrative that attempts such feats must do extra 
ordinary things with time; extraordinary, that is, in the context of daily life, al 
though familiar enough in the conventions of science fiction and in the theory of 
modern physics. Even here, however, Calvino approaches from a fresh direction. 
The ordinary treatment of time in conventional science fiction is to begin with 
the present and then to create an effect of strangeness or distortion through 
fracturing our grasp on chronology. "Time machines" begin with 
us where we 
are, in the contemporary epoch, and startle us by transporting us to the year 2001 
or to the Cro-Magnon cave. Calvino's narrative per se begins, so to speak, after 
the startling is over. The chronological dislocation is included in the axiom that 
precedes the story, one on which the author and reader, for the purposes of the 
story, have agreed to suspend their disbelief. Paradoxically it is the only part of 
the story that is true. In "Sul far del giorno" it takes the form of a paragraph we 
might read any day in the newspaper. 
The planets of the solar system, G. P. Kuiper explains, began to solidi 
fy in the darkness, through the condensation of a fluid, shapeless neb 
ula. All was cold and dark. Later the Sun began to become more con 
centrated until it was reduced to almost its present dimensions, and 
in this process the temperature rose and rose, to thousands of degrees, 
and the Sun started emitting radiations in space. 
I will leave it to the cosmologist how much time these three sentences cover, but 
I would imagine several hundred million years. But Qfwfq's recollections cover 
the span effortlessly, almost absent-mindedly. "Pitch-dark it was," he agrees, "I 
was only a child, I can barely remember it." Psychologically we have the impres 
sion that we are spanning two generations, perhaps, in the culture of a rapidly 
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developing nation. Just as we might note with interest the first telephone in a 
Calabrian village, we note with interest the appearance of the first thing in the 
universe: a blob of slight coagulated nebula that the narrator's brother Rwzfs is 
found playing with one day. Certainly this is a milestone in history, but so was 
the Calabrian telephone; we are duly impressed but no more. It is only shortly 
after this?psychologically about a decade, to judge from the tone of the narrative 
?that the first metals appear in the universe, and Rwzfs, hearing everybody talk 
about nickel, decides, "That's it: it was nickel. I was playing with some nickel!" 
On behavior evidence we can estimate his age in the first of these episodes at 
five, in the second at fifteen. The acceleration leaves us mildly bewildered, but 
no more than we were at the theory of G. P. Kuiper. 
It is characteristic of our contemporary existence, in short, that we have lost 
our 
capacity for astonishment. Last year a man walked on the moon, this year a 
machine lands on Mars, next year the doctors may transplant a brain; or was that 
in the quite improbable movie we saw last week? The humble citizen's organ of 
astonishment is worn out; excessive demands have been made on it. After a time 
we hardly bother to raise our eyebrows at the sweep of progress, whether it is cos 
mic or merely technological. Rwzfs, who has always been "a bit colloidal," mar 
ries an alga and disappears from the story. Granny Bb'b, like a Calabrian grand 
mother living on into a technological age, "clung to her habits of the old days, 
often did embarrassing things: she continued to believe that matter was in uni 
form 
expansion and, for example, that it was enough to throw refuse anywhere 
and it would rarefy and disappear into the distance." She is alienated from her 
progeny; the generation gap is wider than the gulf stretching back to infinity. 
The narrator's sister G'd(w)n, an introvert with artistic inclinations, messes about 
with the primordial ooze, making something she describes as "an outside with an 
inside in it." Later, as the Sun takes fire and the Earth solidifies, she inadvertently 
sinks under the surface and is trapped in the coalescing planet. Then follows a 
sentence worth examining: "My sister had remained there, and I never found out 
whether she had stayed buried in those depths or whether she had reached safety 
on the other side until I met her, much later, at Canberra in 1912, married to a 
certain Sullivan, a retired railroad man, so changed that I hardly recognized her." 
Syntactically the sentence hangs together fairly well and seems to be all about one 
thing, but somewhere in the middle of it we are translated from fantascience to 
the commonplace so deftly we hardly notice the transition. Our feeling is that this 
is what often happens to vaguely artistic young women with no particular talent. 
And yet our atrophied organ of astonishment is jolted into life again by its very 
failure to feel astonishment at something it knows it should be astonished by. 
These stories of Le cosmicomiche and Ti con zero, in borrowing the voice and 
manner of the mythic folktale, the Hesiodic manner, and in their whimsical half 
parodies of archetypes like that of Pygmalion, remind the reader in a non-mythical 
age of the continuing presence of the genre. But they are mythical in another 
and more central sense, in that they set out to generate new images that connect 
the objects of daily existence with the invisible forces that permeate and impel 
them. In this at least, although not in other aspects, they depart fundamentally 
from the concept of story as mimesis. They deal instead with the kind of myth 
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described by Northrop Frye, that "like art, and unlike science . . . deals, not with 
the world that man contemplates, but with the world that man creates." Calvino 
is not satisfied with reminding the reader that the myth is timeless, and then im 
posing on it some more or less modern psychology, as Gide does in his Th?s?e; a 
rather unsatisfactory book, in my opinion. Instead he offers a technical correlative 
to the timelessness; the style and tone are vernacular in the reader's own terms, 
and moreover the whole system of references projected into the narrative come 
from the author's, and reader's, own epoch and not from a historicity only half 
understood. What Zola intended, or ought to have intended, by the expression 
"the experimental novel," and only unsatisfactorily achieved in his own work, has 
been reformulated in our own time by Michel Butor. 
Whereas non-fictional narrative has always the support and sustenance 
of external evidence, the novel must be content with eliciting for us 
what the novel itself contains. This is why it is par excellence the do 
main of phenomenology, par excellence the place to study the ways 
in which reality appears to us or may appear to us; this is why the 
novel is the laboratory of narrative. 
One literary mode, that of conventional or mimetic narrative, gathers the external 
world inward, rearranges it and gives it artistic form; another literary mode pro 
jects the constructs of the imagination outward to influence and rearrange the 
external world, or at least our phenomenological grasp of it. Myths as Calvino 
treats them are therefore not so much timeless as synthetic?imaginative constructs 
that strike us as timeless because they are free from mimetic representation of 
any particular point in time. And yet, in their successive reprojections, the im 
ages are familiar or even banal: chariots and winecups for the Greeks, guitars, 
motorcycles, and popular science for the moderns. Thus the modernity strikes us 
as not flashy or "up to date" but translated out of its universality, so to speak, 
into the vernacular of our own terms and objects. It is possible that this is the liter 
ature of the future; at any rate it is the most promising path open to it in an age 
of industrialized mimesis far more efficient than that of literature. It offers the 
possibility of an experience beyond the capability of technology either to create 
or to mimic; a world, as Qfwfq puts it, "past the semiliquid sphere of the irises, 
in the darkness of the pupils, the mirrored hall of the retinas, in our true element 
which extends without shores, without boundaries." 
* 
?talo Calvino 
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The Other Eurydice 
?talo Calvino 
Translated by Donald Heiney 
You've won, you outsiders, you've rewritten the stories to suit yourselves, con 
demning us to the role it pleases you to assign to us, that of the powers of shadow 
and death, and the name you assign to us, the Underworld Beings, you burden 
with funereal accents. It's true that if everybody really forgets what happened 
among us?Eurydice and Orpheus and me, Pluto?this story which is just the 
other way around from the way you tell it?if the day comes when nobody really 
remembers that Eurydice was one of us and had never lived on the surface of 
the Earth before Orpheus ravished her from me with his lying songs?then our 
old dream of making the Earth a living sphere will be lost forever. 
Even now almost nobody remembers what it meant to bring the Earth to life? 
not what you think, you who are content with this left-over dust of life that col 
lects at the boundary where land, water, and air meet. I wanted Ufe to spread 
out from the center of the Earth, suffuse the concentric spheres of its design, circu 
late among its flowing and solid metals. This was the dream of Pluto. Only thus 
would the Earth have become an enormous living organism, only thus could it 
have escaped this condition of precarious exile that life has been reduced to, the 
opaque weight of a dead stone ball under it, and over it the void. 
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